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Abstract
A New Keynesian framework with endogenous energy production is proposed to
investigate the role of monetary policy in addressing disturbances in energy markets.
The novelty of the model lies in the endogenous production of energy with convex
costs, explicit modeling of goods with different degrees of energy-dependency and
sectoral price rigidities. Our analyses prescribe the desirable monetary responses
to four types of energy price shocks, highlighting the distinct characteristics of
each shock and affirming the need for diverse policy considerations. We also found
several points of divergence in relation to previous studies on addressing energy
supply shocks. In addition, we shed light on the role of sectoral price rigidities in
the shocks’ propagation.
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1 Introduction
Research on the effect of oil price shocks on the economy has been extensive, as shown in
both the empirical and theoretical sides of the literature. A large body of this literature
focuses on the role of monetary policy in times of such shocks, first on whether and
how much monetary policy exacerbates the negative effects of an oil price increase, and
second on the prescriptions for an optimal policy reaction. On this latter question, results
from a number of theoretical investigations involving New Keynesian DSGE models have
produced diverse answers. For instance, Leduc and Sill (2004) prescribe price stability
as the policy of choice in addresing energy (oil) supply shocks, whereas Bodenstein et
al. (2008) argue against this policy, opting instead for more output stabilization. More
recently, there is a growing justification to go beyond oil supply shocks toward examining
the possible different sources of energy price increases. As Kilian (2009) noted, it is of
crucial and practical importance to disentangle the different typess of supply and demand
shocks that could affect energy markets and to distinguish their effects because not all
energy price increases have the same underlying cause or should be treated equally (also
see, e.g., Kilian and Murphy 2012, 2013; Baumeister and Peersman 2013).
The aim of this paper is to address the lack of consensus concerning the case of
an energy supply shock and the question of how monetary policy should respond to a
wider set of energy price increases. It joins the literature on monetary policy in the
context of energy/oil supply shocks, to which the works of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson
(1997), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), Leduc and Sill (2004) and Kormilitsina (2011)
have made major contributions. The paper brings together diverse conclusions on optimal
monetary conduct in response to oil/energy supply shocks and examines where our results
place us along this inflation-output divide. Second, we use the framework to extend the
question of desirable monetary responses to other types of shocks to energy markets.
The endogenous energy production feature brings completion to a theoretical model with
energy at its core and allows energy production and energy price to respond fully to
economic conditions. The introduction of convex costs of energy production helps create
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more-realistic dynamics of energy price and energy supply in response to demand shocks
to the energy market. The third contribution by this paper lies in the multi-sector feature
of the theoretical setup. In introducing sectoral price stickiness, allied with goods with
different degrees of energy dependence (in terms of their consumption), we set out to
investigate whether the relative price rigidity between the two sectors plays an important
role in determining the response of the economy to energy price shocks and to monetary
policy reactions.
We make use of the RBC model in Huynh (2015), which comprises a fully endogenous
energy sector with convex costs in production, a durable sector and a non-durable sector.
New Keynesian features are introduced in the form of monopolistic competition and price
rigidity for the durable and non-durable sectors (energy price is assumed to be flexible),
distortionary taxes and fiscal and monetary authorities. Sectoral price rigidity follows
Monacelli (2009), but our framework is novel in both its setup and approach because it
is augmented by the incorporation of energy production and consumption, and it is used
for analysing energy-related issues. In the strand of related theoretical models, the works
of Leduc and Sill (2004), Kormilitsina (2011), Bodenstein et al. (2008) and Nakov and
Pescatori (2010) provide the background and motivation for our analysis. However, our
framework departs from previous efforts in a number of important dimensions. Leduc and
Sill (2004), Kormilitsina (2011) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010) do not have oil/energy
consumption in the household, thereby missing out on an important channel in terms of
the direct income effect through which energy affects the demand side of the economy.
Both Leduc and Sill (2004) and Kormilitsina (2011) also assumed an exogenous oil price
process. In this type of setup, all instances of energy-related shocks are represented by
an exogenous energy price increase and are therefore considered the same in terms of
their effects on the economy. In such a setup, it is therefore not possible to go beyond
the case of energy supply shock. Bodenstein et al. (2008) and Nakov and Pescatori
(2010) incorporated features of endogenous energy production, but in Bodenstein et al.
(2008), there was no actual energy (oil) production, and Nakov and Pescatori (2010)
employed a different structure of organization of the oil industry. Thus, in Bodenstein
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et al. (2008), whereas energy price can be considered endogenous, energy supply is not
and represents the extreme case of a perfectly inelastic energy source. Energy supply in
Nakov and Pescatori (2010), although endogenous, has too-high price elasticity in the
short run. Our setup is therefore strongly distinguished by the feature of convex costs for
the energy producer. This feature ensures a highly inelastic energy supply to changes in
energy price, as empirically observed1, and endogenously creates energy price dynamics
that come close to the data2.
In terms of examining monetary responses for different types of energy price shocks,
Bodenstein et al. (2012) provided an investigation into this issue. However, in Bodenstein
et al. (2012), the oil supply is again an exogenous endowment, which represents the
extreme case of a perfectly inelastic oil supply and does not capture the dynamics of
energy production. In addition, their analysis had a different focus. They illustrated
the different natures of energy price shocks through the estimated monetary responses
that they induce, not in terms of optimal monetary policy. Their analysis of optimal
policy responses was also different because the search was for a class of optimal monetary
rules in the presence of all shocks, and comparisons were made with actual estimated
rules. In our paper, in contrast, we focus individually on each type of energy price shocks
and investigate the monetary policy rule that maximizes the response of welfare under
each shock. We thus shed light on the different nature of each shock through the optimal
monetary response that is needed. We also consolidate the number of energy price shocks
to three classes of shocks, in contrast to 15 different shocks in Bodenstein et al. (2012),
to make the analysis more in line with Kilian (2008, 2009).
In the context of monetary analysis, our model also differs from these aforementioned
frameworks by explicitly modeling the consumption and production of goods with dif-
ferent degrees of energy-dependence3. This setup introduces additional dynamics into
1Krichene (2005) gave a range of estimates for the short-run price elasticity of oil supply and natural
gas supply and found them to be highly inelastic, with the highest estimate not exceeding 0.1.
2Kim and Loungani (1992) calculated the relative volatility of energy price to output at 6.02 using
US annual data from 1949 to 1987. Huynh (2015), with convex costs in energy production calibrated to
give a price elasticity of energy supply at around 0.1, returns this ratio at 7.1.
3Dhawan and Jeske (2008) employed consumptions of durables and non-durables but not in a mone-
tary policy context.
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household consumption behaviors in response to energy price increases and creates het-
erogeneity in how these shocks affect the different goods sectors. The shocks studied in
this paper follow those of Kilian (2008, 2009): productivity shock to the energy sector,
representing the usual energy supply shock; TFP shock to the non-energy sectors, which
is a type of aggregate shock to energy demand; and two energy market-specific demand
shocks coming from the household and the producers, respectively. We confine the shocks
to those originating from within the economy to facilitate comparisons with Leduc and
Sill (2004) and Kormilitsina (2011) and to focus solely on the monetary policy aspect by
abstracting from the international channels of transmission of energy price shocks.
Concerning the energy supply shock, our results differ from the above-mentioned in
several aspects and find agreement in others. We did not find that price stability is the
best, in contrast to Leduc and Sill (2004). Our findings are more in line with Bodenstein
et al. (2008), in that we lean toward output stabilization with a balanced, dual-mandate
policy to minimize welfare losses in response to this shock. The conclusions drawn by
Nakov and Pescatori (2010) also differ from ours. Although they did propose a certain
degree of focus on output stabilization as an optimal form of monetary policy, their
favorable view of strict price stability and aggressive inflation-fighting policies are in
contrast to what we obtained from our analyses.
Extending the analysis to other types of energy price shocks, we found that in the event
of a positive TFP shock to non-energy producers, which increases the overall demand for
energy, a strong focus on inflation is best in terms of ensuring the highest welfare gain.
We showed that this instance of energy price shock is very distinct from the energy supply
shock, not only in terms of the responses of the economy but also in terms of the relative
performance of alternative monetary regimes. The two specific demand shocks to the
energy market, however, require actions qualitatively similar to the case of an energy
supply shock. Even so, the effectiveness of the best performing policy varies between
these two shocks due to the distinct nature and effect of each shock, particularly on the
durable sector4.
4Huynh (2015).
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Additionally, we showed that the price rigidity of the more energy-consuming goods
plays a greater role in the propagation of energy price shocks. Output, consumption
and other macro variables show higher sensitivity to variation in the price stickiness of
durable goods. Durables’ price rigidity also influences the non-durable sector’s behavior
more than vice versa. This pattern is a result of the more energy-dependent goods sector
always showing more volatile responses when energy price changes and of the interplay
between the substitution effect and the income effect that causes the consumption of
durables to vary little when the price of non-durables changes.
2 Model Description
2.1 Households
The representative household consumes a CES aggregation of durables and non-durables
of the following form
ct = [α
1−ρ(utdt)ρ + (1− α)1−ρntρ]1/ρ
where nt is the household’s consumption on non-durables, dt is the household’s stock
of durables and ut is the utilization rate of this durables stock. The elasticity of substi-
tution between durables and non-durables is represented by 1
1−ρ . Together, utdt defines
the service the household derives from its existing stock of durables in period t.
Household energy usage
Household use of durables needs energy, the amount of which (eh,t) is variable in each
period and directly dependent upon the utilization rate and stock of durables. Energy
consumption does not enter the utility function directly; instead, its cost enters into the
household budget constraint. In this specification, the model makes use of the specifi-
cation in Finn (2000) and extends it to the household. Household use of energy in each
period can be considered a function of the stock of durables multiplied by its utilization
rate eh,t = f(utdt). In all analyses performed in this paper, the amount of energy needed
to sustain a utilization rate ut of a stock of durables dt is assumed linearly dependent
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upon their product utdt, that is, eh,t = autdt, where a is a constant to be calibrated. This
linear relationship carries the assumption that aggregate durables have a constant energy
intensity.
In addition, to model an energy market-specific demand shock originating from the
household, we add the following exogenous shock to the household energy demand func-
tion:
eh,t = µa,tautdt (1)
where µa,t is an AR(1) process with mean 1 and subject to i.i.d. innovations:
µa,t − 1 = ρa(µa,t−1 − 1) + a,t, a,t ∼i.i.d N(0, σ2e,a) (2)
The representative household problem is therefore to maximize its expected lifetime
utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, ht) (3)
where
Ut = ϕlogct + (1− ϕ)log(1− ht)
subject to the following budget constraint:
(1 + τe,c,t)pe,tautdt + (1 + τc,t)pn,tnt + (1 + τc,t)pd,tid,t + pd,tik,t + iB,t
= (1− τi,t)(wtht + rtkt) +RtBt
(4)
where id,t, ik,t and iB,t denote investments in durables, capital and government risk-free
bonds respectively, rt the return on capital, wt the wage and Rt the return on government
bonds. The household earns its income from the rental of its capital stock to firms, its
labor service and the return on its government bonds. The taxes it must pay are an
ad-valorem tax on its energy consumption, income tax on its wage and return on capital,
and consumption tax on its durable and non-durable consumption. Investments in capital
and durables are subject to the following adjustment costs:
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id,t = dt+1 − (1− δd,t)dt + ωd1
1 + ωd2
(
dt+1 − dt
dt
)1+ωd2
(5)
ik,t = kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + ωk1
1 + ωk2
(
kt+1 − kt
kt
)1+ωk2
(6)
Investment in government bonds is also subject to a portfolio adjustment cost and is
given by
iB,t = Bt+1 −Bt + ωB1
1 + ωB2
(
Bt+1 − B¯
)1+ωB2 (7)
With B¯ calibrated, it is then possible to solve for the aggregate price level in the
economy. The rate of depreciation of durables is variable and varies positively with the
utilization rate. Here, we use a power-function form for the depreciation rate, following
Finn (2000)
δd,t =
a1
a2 + 1
ut
a2+1 (8)
The household’s choice of {nt, ut, ht, dt+1, kt+1, Bt+1} to maximize (1) subject to (2),
(3), (4), (5) and (6) results in the usual first-order conditions, detailed in appendix A.
2.2 Energy Usage in Production
This framework assumes that each sector’s energy use is tied directly to its use of capital,
i.e., ef,t = g(kt), with g a function to be determined. Similar to the household case,
g is calibrated to be a simple linear function, except for the energy sector; that is, a
non-energy sector’s energy consumption is given by ef,t = bkt, where b is a constant. For
the overall analysis in this paper, it suffices to assume that b is the same for the two
non-energy sectors. This parameter b is thus a technological parameter that embodies
the energy intensity of capital. The relationship ef,t = bkt implies a very high degree of
complementarity between capital and energy. With this specification, we emphasize the
fundamental importance of energy in production.
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Again, we can model an energy market-specific demand shock originating from the
producers by introducing an exogenous shock to the producers’ energy demand function
such that for each producer
ej,t = µb,tbkj,t (9)
where µb,t is an AR(1) process with mean 1 and subject to i.i.d. innovations:
µb,t − 1 = ρb(µb,t−1 − 1) + b,t, b,t ∼i.i.d N(0, σ2e,b) (10)
2.3 Energy Production
The energy sector operates in a perfectly competitive market, and energy price is assumed
fully flexible. The model implements an energy production with convex costs to bring
about low price elasticity of energy supply.
The production function of the energy sector takes the form
ye,t = exp(Ae,t)k
γe
e,th
1−γe
e,t (11)
Ae,t is the energy sector-specific productivity process:
Ae,t = ρeAe,t−1 + e,t (12)
Energy needed to operate capital in energy production is dependent upon the level of
output at an increasing rate:
be,t =
ωe1
(1 + ωe2)
(kγee,th
1−γe
e,t )
1+ωe2 (13)
This convex energy intensity of capital used in energy production creates a mechanism
whereby when a demand shock hits the energy market the energy sector cannot simply
expand its output by a large percentage quickly. The calibration section will explain in
more detail the process of calibrating this convex cost.
The firm’s maximization is
9
max
{pe,t,ke,t,he,t}
{pe,tye,t − wthe,t − rtke,t − (1 + τe,f,t)pe,tbe,tke,t} (14)
where τe,f,t is an ad-valorem tax on the firm’s energy usage.
2.4 Durable and Non-durable Final Goods Producers
Each sector has a perfectly competitive final good producer that purchases the interme-
diate goods in that sector and assembles them into the final product according to the
following production function:
yi,t =
(∫ 1
0
yi,j,t
i−1
i dj
) i
i−1
(15)
where i is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated varieties in sector i
(i = d, n), yi,j,t the output of each firm j in sector i, and yi,t the output of the final goods
producer in sector i.
Profit maximization means that each firm j in sector i faces the following demand
schedule for its good:
yi,j,t =
(
pi,j,t
pi,t
)−i
yi,t (16)
where pi,j,t is the price of firm j’s good in sector i, and pi,t the aggregate price index
in sector i, given by
pi,t =
(∫ 1
0
pi,j,t
1−idj
) 1
1−i
(17)
2.5 Durable and Non-durable Intermediate Goods Producers
It is assumed that in each sector i, there exists a continuum (with a mass index of 1) of
firms, each producing a variety j of that sector’s goods in a monopolistically competitive
market. Each firm j in each sector has access to the same kind of production technology
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specific to that sector:
yi,j,t = exp(At) (ki,j,t)
γi (hi,j,t)
1−γi − χi (18)
where i = d, n and χi denotes fixed costs of production for sector i.
At is a technology process that is common across the two sectors:
At = ρAAt−1 + A,t (19)
Since each firm has monopolistic power over its own variety, it can set prices to
maximize its profit. However, every time it does so, it incurs a Rotemberg-style quadratic
cost proportional to final output in the following form:
ϑi
2
(
pi,j,t
pi,j,t−1
− 1
)2
yi,t (20)
Each firm’s objective is to choose a sequence of price, labor and capital {pi,j,t, hi,j,t, ki,j,t}
to maximize its expected discounted nominal profits:
E0{
∞∑
t=0
Λi,t(pi,j,tyi,j,t−wthi,j,t−(rt+bpe,t(1+τe,f,t))ki,j,t− ϑi
2
(
pi,j,t
pi,j,t−1
− 1
)2
pi,tyi,t)} (21)
where Λi,t is the stochastic discount factor.
By log-linearizing the resulting first-order condition of the above problem around a
zero-inflation deterministic steady state, a sectoral Phillips curve is obtained for each
sector i:
pˆii,t = βEt[pˆii,t+1] +
i − 1
ϑi
ˆmci,t (22)
where pˆii,t denotes the log-deviation of sector i’s inflation from its steady-state value,
and ˆmci,t the log-deviation of sector i’s real marginal cost from the steady state.
In a symmetric equilibrium, each sector i’s real marginal cost is given by
mci,texp(At)(1− γi)
(
ki,t
hi,t
)γi
=
wt
pi,t
(23)
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together with sector i’s first-order condition resulting from cost minimization:
1− γi
γi
ki,t
hi,t
=
wt
rt + bpe,t(1 + τe,f,t)
(24)
Wage and the rate of return on capital are assumed equalized across all three sectors.
2.6 CPI Inflation
The CPI index for the economy is given by
pt =
[
α (pd,t + ape,t)
ρ
ρ−1 + (1− α)p
ρ
ρ−1
n,t
] ρ−1
ρ
(25)
Gross CPI inflation is thus
pit =
pt
pt−1
(26)
2.7 Fiscal and Monetary Policies
On the fiscal side, the government levies three types of taxes: ad-valorem tax on energy
consumption on both the household and the producers, consumption tax on durable and
non-durable consumption, and income tax on return on capital and wage. In addition,
it also issues risk-free bonds each period to the household. This revenue from taxes and
bonds is used to finance its spending and interest payment on the household’s current
bond holdings.
Its budget constraint is given by
τe,c,tpe,tautdt + τe,f,tpe,t(b(kd,t + kn,t) + be,tke,t) + τc,t(pn,tnt + pd,tid,t) + τi,t(rtkt + wtht)
+iB,t = ptgtyt +RtBt
(27)
where gt indicates government spending as a fraction of real output and is given as
an exogenous stochastic process. Here, we assume that for its spending, the government
consumes a CES basket of durables and non-durables, similarly to the household, sans
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the utilization rate for durables:
gtyt =
[
α1−ρgρd,t + (1− α)1−ρgρn,t
]1/ρ
(28)
such that
ptgtyt = pd,tgd,t + pn,tgn,t + pe,tagd,t (29)
The fiscal authority follows a passive fiscal regime, with the sole aim of debt stabi-
lization. To do so, it sets tax rates for each period as a function of the outstanding bond
balance at the beginning of the period5:
log
(
τ(),t
τ¯()
)
= ρ()log
(
τ(),t−1
τ¯()
)
+ φ()log
(
Bt
B¯
)
(30)
where τ(),t represents the general term for all four types of taxes in our model, with
() = (e, t), (e, f), c, i, and τ¯() the corresponding steady-state rate for each tax. B¯ is the
steady-state value of nominal government debt.
The monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate on risk-free bonds
according to the following Taylor-type rule:
Rt −R∗ = αR(Rt−1 −R∗) + αpi(pit − pi∗) + αy(yt − yt−1) + r,t (31)
where R∗ is the interest rate target consistent with the steady-state nominal return
on risk-free bonds, pi∗ is the inflation target, and r,t is an exogenous shock to the interest
rate rule.
2.8 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Factor markets clear
kt = kd,t + kn,t + ke,t (32)
5These rules follow closely in form those of Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2009).
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ht = hd,t + hn,t + he,t (33)
as do goods markets
yd,t = id,t + ik,t + gd,t +
ϑd
2
(pid,t − 1)2yd,t (34)
yn,t = nt + gn,t +
ϑn
2
(pin,t − 1)2yn,t (35)
Aggregate output (value added) is defined as
ptyt = pd,tyd,t + pn,tyn,t + pe,tautdt (36)
2.9 Exogenous driving processes
The model is driven by four main shocks: the conventional TFP shock that is common
to both the durable and non-durable sectors, a productivity shock that affects the energy
sector alone, and shocks to the energy intensities of durables and of capital (shocks to a
and to b, respectively).
3 Model Calibration, Solution and Welfare Measure
3.1 Model Calibration
The model is calibrated to the broad characteristics of the U.S. economy at quarterly
frequency. Table 6 displays the empirical ratios of main U.S. macro variables obtained
from Dhawan and Jeske (2008)6 for the calibration of the model.
Certain standard parameters are calibrated following the standard literature. The
discount factor β is set at 0.99, which translates to an annual interest rate of approx-
imately 4%. The share of consumption in the household utility function ϕ is set at
0.34, and the share of durables α in consumption is set at 0.2. Empirical research sets
the elasticity of substitution between durables and non-durables close to 1. Here, it
is set at 0.99 for the main analyses, and the CES parameter of the household utility
6Dhawan and Jeske (2008), Table 1.
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function is therefore ρ = 1 − 1/0.99, which is negative and indicates that durables and
non-durables are somewhat complementary. Other parameters are calibrated to produce
theoretical moments of model aggregates that reproduce as best as possible the empirical
moments found in aggregate US data. Quarterly capital depreciation is calibrated at
1.5%, whereas the parameters of the durable depreciation function are chosen to produce
a steady-state quarterly depreciation rate of 3.3% and a utilization rate of approximately
80% for durables. Hence, a1 = 0.055, and a2 = 0.3. The calibration of the parameters
a and b, the degrees of energy-dependence of durables and capital respectively, is based
approximately on the empirical ratios Eh/Y and Ef/Y in Table 6. The resulting calibra-
tion is a = 0.06, and b = 0.012. The functional forms of capital and durable adjustment
costs are given in the form of a general power function governed by two parameters ω1
and ω2. In this paper, we assume a quadratic form for both stocks; thus, ωd2 = ωk2 = 1.
The remaining choice of ω1 does not affect the steady state of the model; thus, it is chosen
using the volatilities of capital and durables in the data as a guide. We used the following
calibration: ωk1 = 3, ωk2 = 1, ωd1 = 6, and ωd2 = 1.
The parameters of the three sectors’ production functions are also calibrated using
the ratios in Table 6 as a guide plus additional ratios such as the ratio of durable con-
sumption to total real personal consumption. The capital share of the energy sector is
also calibrated to be greater than the average value of 0.36 usually found in the literature,
meaning that the energy sector is more capital-intensive. Additionally, the calibration of
these parameters depends largely upon the equilibrium dynamics of the system, meaning
that they are also carefully chosen so that the model produces a stable equilibrium.
The parameters for the convex cost function of the energy sector are calibrated to
bring about low price elasticity of energy supply and energy price dynamics that reflect
empirical facts. In addition, their choices are also constrained by the volatility of various
energy-related variables such as household and producer energy consumption and energy
output and, of no less importance, by the equilibrium dynamics of the model. Parameter
values that yield very low price elasticity of energy supply result in excess volatility of
variables and often cause the model to have no stable equilibrium. Here, we chose a cubic
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power function form for the convex cost, so that ωe2 = 2. ωe1 is then calibrated to be
3.77 to yield a price elasticity of energy supply of approximately 0.1, keeping it as close
to the range of empirical estimates as possible while ensuring that the model has a stable
equilibrium around the steady state.
Both the durable and non-durable sectors have their elasticity of substitution between
their own varieties, d and n, set at 5, a value frequently used in the literature, to yield a
steady-state flexible-price markup of 25%. The price adjustment cost parameters for the
durable and non-durable sectors, ϑd and ϑn , are calibrated following the method used
in Monacelli (2009), which matches the coefficient on the deviation of real marginal cost
in the new Keynesian Phillips curve obtained in this model with its counterpart in the
Phillips curve obtained from Calvo-type price rigidity. In the usual framework of price
rigidity using Calvo-style contracts, the fraction of firms that cannot change their prices
in any given quarter is set at 0.75 to obtain a price contract length of approximately 4
quarters, a standard calibration in the recent literature. The coefficient on the deviation of
real marginal cost in such Phillips curve is given by (1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
with θ = 0.75, whereas that
in the Phillips curve derived here is i−1
ϑi
. Equating these two thus yields ϑd = ϑn = 46,
meaning that for the baseline analysis, the prices of the two sectors are considered equally
sticky.
Ad-valorem energy taxes are calibrated to be 10% at the steady state, whereas income
tax is 15%, and consumption tax is 7%. Government spending is calibrated to be 18%
of output at the steady state. For the baseline Taylor-type monetary policy rule, we
follow the estimates of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), which were also used in Leduc
and Sill (2004), setting αR = 0.8, αpi = 0.2, and αy = 0.09. The parameters for the
tax rules are calibrated to ensure a determinate equilibrium for the model and stable
dynamics of government debt. They are chosen to be ρe,c = ρe,f = ρc = ρi = 0.8, and
φe,c = φe,f = φc = φi = 0.12.
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3.2 Model Solution and Welfare Measure
The model is solved for its steady state using a non-linear solver, and the set of equilibrium
conditions is approximated around the steady state using the first-order perturbation
method. The system’s decision rules and transition functions are thus obtained.
The welfare variable is defined in the model as a value function of the following form:
Vt = Ut(c
∗
t , h
∗
t ) + βVt+1 (37)
where Ut(c
∗
t , h
∗
t ) = φlogc
∗
t +(1−φ)log(1−h∗t ) denotes the optimized instantaneous utility
derived from the optimal decisions of ct and ht. This welfare variable can then be solved
together with the model’s equilibrium conditions, and the resulting law of motion for Vt
yields the stream of maximized welfare for the household.
With this welfare variable, we can obtain an impulse response of social welfare to each
energy price shock, allowing us to compute a measure of welfare loss for the shock under
analysis, calculated as the accumulated deviation of Vt from the steady-state welfare over
the time horizon of the deviation. This welfare loss allows us to rank different monetary
policy regimes in response to energy price shocks in terms of how much welfare is lost (or
gained) under each regime.
4 Cyclical Properties
The model is calibrated with shocks to the productivity processes of the non-energy
sectors and the energy sector. The standard errors of the two shocks are chosen to
produce moments that are closest to those found in U.S. data. Table 1 compares the
relative volatility of various aggregates to output between the model and U.S. data. The
empirical ratios were calculated from Dhawan and Jeske (2008), which was also used
initially for reference and calibration.
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Variables Model U.S. data
Output 1 1
Consumption 0.67 0.80
Nondurables consumption 0.59 0.52
Durables consumption 2.91 2.90
Capital Investment 3.18 3.42
Hours 0.62 0.96
Household’s energy consumption 1.73 1.34
Table 1: Relative volatility of aggregates to output
These relative volatilities illustrate the cyclical properties of the model, which broadly
reflect the cyclical patterns of the U.S. economy. Total consumption and consumption of
non-durables are both less volatile than is output, and althought total consumption is less
volatile in the model than in the data, consumption of nondurables is less volatile than is
total consumption and reflects the trend in the data. Investments in the model are both
significantly more volatile than output, which is also the case empirically. Furthermore,
consumption of durables comes close to matching its empirical counterpart, as does capital
investment.
Household energy consumption, however, has a higher volatility in the model than in
the data. The model also does less well in reflecting hours worked because the relative
volatility of hours worked in the model is lower. A possible source of this low volatility
concerns the frictionless movement of labor among the three sectors in the model. By
making the relocation of labor more difficult/costly, labor movements might be made
more realistic, which might help increase the volatility of total labor.
The presence of an energy sector produces an endogenous energy price, and the model
produces energy price dynamics that come quite close to that found in the data. Table 2
shows the relative volatility of energy price to output and energy price-output correlation.
For comparison, we present the same quantities calculated from Kim and Loungani (1992)
in column 3. From the data, it is found that energy price is highly volatile, its percent
standard deviation is several times that of output, and its correlation with output is
negative. We can see that the model captures these features of energy price dynamics
reasonably well. Kim and Loungani (1992) calculated the ratio of percent standard
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deviation of energy price to that of output to be 6, and their correlation to be -0.44
using annual data. Our model puts these two quantities at 6.22 and -0.42, respectively,
calibrated at quarterly frequency.
Model Kim and Loungani (1992)
Energy price-output 6.22 6.02
Energy Price-Output Corr -0.42 -0.44
Table 2: Energy Price Dynamics. Row 1 shows the relative standard deviation of energy price to output,
row 2 displays the correlation between energy price and output.
5 Systematic Monetary Policy Response to Energy Price Shocks
5.1 Energy Supply Shock
One of the main areas of debate has been the role of monetary policy in the event of an
adverse energy supply shock. Kormilitsina (2011) and Leduc and Sill (2004) arrived at
different conclusions on what the optimal monetary policy would be. Bodenstein et al.
(2008) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010) incorporated features of endogenous energy price
into their frameworks and also arrived at different optimal monetary policy responses
to an energy supply shock. We conducted our own analysis of this shock using our
framework to see where our results sit in relation to these previous works and to shed
light on the differences between our findings and their results. We calibrated the shock to
the productivity of the energy sector to produce a 10% increase in energy price. This is
a temporary shock that creates a half-life for the energy price increase of approximately
12 quarters. For our analysis, the inflation coefficient (αpi) of the Taylor rule is swept
from 0 to 0.4, and the output coefficient (αy) is swept from 0 to 0.3. Figure 1 shows the
welfare loss corresponding to each combination of (αpi, αy), whereas Table 3 compares
the welfare losses of selected regimes: price-stability, output-stability, interest-peg and
the best-performing regime.
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Regimes Welfare Gain (%)
Max price-stability -8.32
Max output-stability -7.62
Interest-peg -7.72
Best-performing (αpi = 0.24, αy = 0.3) -6.74
Table 3: Performance of various monetary regimes.
One main observation stands out when the monetary policy function pays no attention
to output. As more emphasis is placed on fighting inflation, welfare loss becomes progres-
sively worse and then recovers, although the objective of obtaining a smoother response
in inflation is achieved. When more weight is placed on output, welfare loss becomes
smaller, but inflation also rises. However, at the highest value of the output coefficient
(0.3), as the inflation coefficient increases, inflation response also becomes smoother (Fig.
2). A larger weight on inflation helps manage inflation expectations and thus keeps the
interest rate from changing too rapidly from one period to the next. Responding to
output alone doesn’t appear to bring much change in welfare loss (the outer edge of the
surface plot).
The best response in terms of welfare loss is achieved when the monetary rule is
aggressive in both responding to output fluctuations and managing inflation expectations.
That situation occurs when the weight on output is at maximum at 0.3 and the weight on
inflation is at 0.24. The path of the nominal interest rate (Fig. 3) shows that the monetary
authority is required to bring it down gradually before slowly raising it. Inflation is thus
initially accommodated; then, as energy price starts its downward path, the interest
rate slowly drops to stimulate output. As energy price drops further and the pressure
on inflation increases, the interest rate slowly rises to tighten up the monetary response.
Solely focusing on inflation yields less volatility in inflation but higher volatility in output.
A policy that is aggressive in fighting both inflation and output fluctuations appears to
provide the best trade-off between the volatilities of the two variables.
The responses of the economy to this wide range of monetary regimes are understood
by examining the source of the energy price shock. When energy price jumps due to a real
decline in energy supply, the real price of energy relative to durables and non-durables
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surges, and real marginal costs of capital of the producers are pushed up. Aggregate
supply shrinks, leading to a drop in output. Fig. 4 shows the impact of this shock
without monetary intervention. The presence of nominal price rigidities means that non-
energy producers are even more sluggish in adjusting their prices to keep up with the
energy price increase, making the increase in real marginal costs worse than in the case
of full price flexibility. Because the household is also affected by the negative income
effect due to higher energy price, aggregate demand also shifts leftward (Fig. 5). Thus,
this energy price increase results in the contraction of both demand and supply. A strict
price stability regime is forced to raise the interest rate right after the shock hits to fight
the rising price level. However, because a large part of this upward pressure on marginal
costs is due to the surge in the real price of energy, a desirable reduction in real marginal
costs can only come from engineering a reduction in energy price relative to other prices.
Raising the interest rate engenders a reduction in the relative price of energy indirectly
through deflating the prices of non-energy goods by contracting aggregate demand, but
this action turns out to be too broad and too aggressive, causing aggregate demand, and
hence output and welfare, to drop even further (Fig. 6).
The optimal monetary policy response to this shock would be to push up aggregate
demand already depressed by higher energy price. In doing so, the producers are forced
to operate at an even higher level of marginal costs, and inflation is pushed up further.
However, as demand is forced to shift back to the right, the drop in output and consump-
tion is lessened (Fig. 7). The trade-off is precisely the opposite of a restrictive monetary
stance. The real price of energy rises slightly higher, but the benefit to welfare outweighs
this cost.
Focusing solely on variations in output, however, results in the interest rate dropping
too much too quickly, causing an excessive stimulus to aggregate demand. With a sole,
strong focus on output, in the subsequent periods, the monetary policy is then forced to
bring the interest rate back up quickly. This course of action thus actually leads to more
volatility in output and inflation. Figure 8 illustrates the volatility brought about by a
sole focus on output.
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Our results deviate from those of Leduc and Sill (2004), which called for price stability
as the weapon of choice against such shocks. They showed that increasing the weight on
output always amplifies the negative effect of the shock, whereas increasing the weight
on inflation always does the opposite, regardless of the weight on the other coefficient.
Our results shows that increasing the weight on inflation does not always lead to lower
welfare losses, but rather only in cases in which the weight on output is sufficiently high,
and that increasing the weight on output actually always leads to lower welfare losses.
For us, consequently, a hawkish stance on inflation should not be without a strong focus
on output. This main distinction between our findings and those of Leduc and Sill (2004)
stems from the exogenous nature of oil price in their framework. An oil price increase
in such a nominal environment does not necessarily reflect a real disturbance coming
from a shrink in the oil supply. As Nakov and Pescatori (2010) stated, such a shock is
observationally equivalent to a negative TFP shock, and a ‘divine coincidence’ occurs for
the monetary authority when it tries to stabilize prices.
Our findings are more in line with Bodenstein et al. (2008), who found that an
aggressive inflation-targeting regime is not helpful in terms of welfare and that a balanced,
‘dual-mandate’ regime performs well relative to the optimal policy. Our results, similar
to theirs, lean toward output stabilization. Nakov and Pescatori (2010), although also
using welfare as the criterion for evaluating alternative monetary regimes, did not come
to conclusions similar to those of Bodenstein et al. (2008). They did stress that a
strict price stability regime deviates from an optimal policy but did not go as far toward
output stabilization. Their distinction from our results also rests on several points about
the relative merits of alternative policies. In Nakov and Pescatori (2010), a baseline
Taylor rule performs worse than does a more aggressive inflation-fighting policy or a
strict inflation targeting policy. They also found that an interest rate peg regime is
the worst of all, not only in terms of welfare but also in terms of inflation and output
contraction and volatility. Our analyses come to opposite conclusions on both of these
points. Furthermore, according to their results, the best policy in the class of Taylor
rules using observed instruments is one that responds positively to oil prices. However,
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that would mean raising the interest rate as though fighting inflation, a stance that our
results do not advocate. In relation to Kormilitsina (2011), our results agree that inflation
should be allowed to rise. However, Kormilitsina’s (2011) prescription of a higher nominal
interest rate does not include anything more specific on actual optimal monetary rules.
5.2 TPF shock to non-energy producers
The picture is different for the case of a positive productivity shock to the non-energy
sectors. Such a supply shock could cause energy price to increase, although it would lead
to a drop in non-energy prices and the general price level. This energy price increase
reflects a broad, indirect demand shock to the energy market as the household consumes
and invests more in durables and the producers use more capital in production (Fig.
9). Figure 10 shows the welfare loss corresponding to each combination of (αpi, αy),
and Table 4 shows the welfare losses of selected regimes: price-stability, output-stability,
interest-peg and the best-performing regime.
Regimes Welfare Gain (%)
Max price-stability 5.28
Max output-stability 4.19
Interest-peg 4.45
Best-performing (αpi = 0.24, αy = 0) 8.61
Table 4: Performance of various monetary regimes.
For this shock, aggressively responding to inflation/deflation appear to be the most
effective means of accommodating the expanding business cycle, ensuring the highest gain
in welfare. In contrast to the energy supply shock, as more weight is placed on output,
welfare gain decreases. Again, responding solely to output does not bring meaningful
variations in welfare gain.
The main distinction from the case of energy supply shock comes from the comove-
ments between output and energy price and between inflation and energy price. The
economy benefits from a rightward shift in aggregate supply, leading to an expansion in
output (Fig. 9). Therefore, the optimal response is to bring aggregate demand up slowly
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to catch up. An inflation-focused monetary objective in this case serves that purpose.
This causes energy price to rise higher, but the expansionary monetary stance quickly
stabilizes the price level as well (Fig. 11).
Focusing only on output results in a rise in the interest rate that puts a brake on the
expansion. This brake has the immediate effect of dampening consumption and invest-
ments (Fig. 12), leading to deeper drops in real marginal costs, because the producers
must balance increased productivity with a more slowly growing demand. But this also
means that the household is transferring its current consumption to the future as it seeks
to invest its income in bonds. This transfer comes at a time when higher productivity
is causing output, and consequently household income, to grow. This pressure is instead
transferred into excess bond holdings. After the inter-temporal effects of increasing the
interest rate have been in play for a few quarters, they start to bring higher income to
the household. Therefore, as the momentum of a supply increase slows, demand starts
its own upward momentum. However, the effects of the higher interest rate also include
lower investment in capital. Thus, in the initial period of the supply expansion, capital
build-up is slower; a smaller proportion of the expanding output is transferred into capi-
tal for future production. Thus, higher weights on output cause a greater dampening of
demand at the start but greater demand momentum later, resulting in higher volatility in
output, consumption and investments (Fig. 12), and they also cause a portion of output
growth to be lost because of an inefficient build-up of capital.
A prescription for monetary policy thus calls for a strong take on inflation. The
interest rate is kept slightly lower than its steady state for a long period to sustain the
productivity increase (Fig. 11). This interest rate path has the effect of releasing most of
the deflationary pressure because it allows demand to shift quickly to meet the increase
in supply. Consequently, we have smoother responses for all of the macro variables, and
prices are thus allowed to slowly decline over the period of higher productivity.
The optimal policy results from this section as well as from section 5.1 highlight the
crucial consideration that is a common theme in dealing with energy price shocks: the
trade-off between the immediate effect on aggregate demand of a monetary response and
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its longer-term, inter-temporal effect, particularly on capital.
5.3 Energy market-specific Demand Shocks
The endogenous energy production and convex costs allow us to analyze the macroeco-
nomic effects of demand shocks to the energy market, because they create a mechanism
for large energy price responses and a much less responsive energy supply, a stylized
fact about energy observed in the data. The two energy market-specific demand shocks
analyzed here are a shock to the household energy intensity of durables, represented by
the parameter a, and a shock to the producer energy intensity of capital, represented
by the parameter b. Figures 13 and 14 show the welfare losses corresponding to each
combination of (αpi, αy) for the two shocks, with the magnitude of each shock calibrated
at 10% of the steady-state intensities, and Table 5 shows the welfare losses of selected
regimes: price-stability, output-stability, interest-peg and the best-performing regime.
Max price Max output Interest peg Best performing
Welfare Gain (%) -14.2 -13.1 -13.2 -12.1
Welfare Gain (%) -23.2 -21.2 -21.5 -18.2
Table 5: Row 1: shock to energy intensity of durables, 14.9% energy price increase. Row 2: shock to
energy intensity of capital, 27.1% energy price increase.
Qualitatively, these two shocks call for policy responses similar to the case of an
energy supply shock. The overall effect on aggregate demand of these two shocks is
contractionary due to the large negative income effect that higher energy price has on
durable and non-durable consumption. The effect of higher energy price also spills over
to the supply side, because energy is an input into production. Therefore, with both
demand and supply contracting, the situation is similar to the case of an energy supply
shock. Energy price and output again have a negative relationship, and real energy price
and inflation move together. In such cases, the call again is for a strong focus on output to
stimulate demand and to let inflation rise at the start, but at the same time maintaining
a tight rein on inflation to avoid excess stimulation and high output volatility.
What distinguishes these two shocks from the usual energy supply crunch is the
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relative effectiveness of the monetary response. The relative extent of the effect of an
energy price increase on demand and supply varies strongly between these two shocks.
It is thus expected that, quantitatively at least, there would be varying degrees in the
influence of monetary policy in response to these shocks. Table 5 shows that monetary
policy response does not lead to the same welfare losses (in terms of energy price elasticity)
between these two shocks. Of the three adverse shocks, the shock to the energy intensity
of durables causes the worst welfare losses under all monetary regimes, whereas the shock
to the energy intensity of capital is similar to the energy supply shock in its effect on
welfare. As explained in Huynh (2015), the demand shock coming from the increase
in the energy intensity of durables has a disproportionately greater effect on aggregate
demand. The reason is the presence of an amplification mechanism on the demand side
in the case of this shock. When the household durable stock is more energy-intensive,
the impact of the demand shock goes beyond energy price because the increased cost
of durable investment and utilization is reflected by more than just energy price. The
energy price elasticities of household consumption and investment (with the exception of
capital investment) in this case are greater in magnitude than either the energy supply
shock or the shock to the energy intensity of capital. As a result, aggregate demand is
shifted left by a greater extent compared with the other two shocks, causing a larger
negative impact on household welfare.
Thus, it is expected that the benefit of the best performing regime is smaller for a
demand shock coming from an increase in the energy intensity of durables. The greater
pressure of high energy price on durable consumption causes the expansionary monetary
regime to be less effective at expanding aggregate demand. Conversely, the demand
shock coming from a higher energy intensity of capital has a relatively greater effect on
aggregate supply, since the amplification of the shock is on the producers. Without as
much pressure on the household, as a result, an output-stabilization regime is able to
stimulate demand to a greater extent.
The two demand shocks to the energy market show important quantitative differences
in their effect on the business cycle and in their interactions with monetary responses.
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These distinctions come from the different degrees of effect on the demand and supply
sides of the economy and the diverse relocations of resources in accordance with the
sources of the shocks. As a result, the effectiveness of monetary intervention varies
between the two shocks. The need here is to be mindful of this fact to avoid going too
little or too far in devising the appropriate responses.
6 Role of Sectoral Price Rigidities
In the baseline calibration of the model, the two non-energy sectors have the same degree
of price rigidity. Given the different degrees of energy dependency between the consump-
tion of durables and non-durables, it is natural to pose the question as to whether there is
a difference in the sensitivity of the business cycle to these price rigidities in the event of
energy price shocks. For this investigation, we ran the model along a two-dimensional grid
containing values of price rigidities of the durable and non-durable sector. Throughout
this exercise, the monetary policy function is kept at the baseline Taylor-type specifica-
tion. Figures 15 and 17 display the output responses to the energy supply shock and the
TFP shock to the non-energy producers at three degrees of non-durables’ price rigidity
relative to that of durables: more flexible (ϑn = 1), as sticky (ϑn = 46), and more sticky
(ϑn = 86), whereas Figures 16 to 18 show the output responses to these two shocks at
three degrees of durables’ price rigidity relative to that of non-durables: more flexible
(ϑd = 1), as sticky (ϑd = 46), and more sticky (ϑd = 86).
The graphs show that the price rigidity of the durable sector plays a greater role in
transmitting energy price shocks. Output (value added) displays a higher sensitivity to
variation in this price rigidity for both shocks. The main explanation is in the more
volatile response of the durable sector. Nondurables become ’anchor’ goods in periods of
energy price fluctuations; thus, their consumption shows much less sensitivity than does
durable (and capital) consumption to energy price changes. Another reason is that the
response of the non-durable sector shows a higher sensitivity to variations in durables’
price rigidity than vice versa. Consequently, when the price rigidity of durables varies,
both durable and non-durable output displays considerable sensitivity. Conversely, when
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the price rigidity of non-durables changes, the sensitivity of durable output is smaller.
This asymmetry in how price rigidity in one sector affects consumption/output of
the other sector’s goods is a direct consequence of the different degrees of energy de-
pendence between these two types of goods. As energy price rises, it triggers a substi-
tution effect that moves the household from more energy-dependent goods toward less
energy-dependent goods, while consumption of both these goods drops due to the income
effect. Consumption of durables thus moves much more strongly than the consumption
of non-durables. Upon the impact of energy price shocks, the household moves to a point
of consumption at which the marginal utility of durable consumption is much greater
than that of non-durable consumption. Greater flexibility in the prices of more energy-
dependent goods, meaning the initial surge in their prices is higher, reinforces the move
toward less energy-consuming goods but also requires the household to acquire a relatively
large quantity of non-durables for a small marginal reduction in durable consumption.
Non-durable consumption is therefore highly sensitive to the price stickiness of durables.
Conversely, when prices of non-durables are more flexible, the move back toward durable
consumption simply does not occur with the same magnitude, because the household is
willing to give up a large margin of non-durables for a relatively smaller marginal gain in
durable consumption. Thus, durable consumption and output do not exhibit the same
sensitivity to nondurables’ price rigidity.
7 Conclusion
This paper employs a New Keynesian model with endogenous energy production to extend
the analysis on the role of monetary policy in the event of shocks to the energy market.
The framework makes use of convex costs in energy production to create dynamics of
energy supply and energy price that come close to empirical observations. This convex
cost feature and the presence of multiple sectors represent a marked departure from
previous theoretical works on the subject.
Our findings show a number of distinctions from and agreements with results from
previous works in the case of energy supply shocks. We lean toward output stabilization,
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as did Bodenstein et al. (2008), with an appropriate degree of price stability to avoid
excessive volatility in output and prices. Our results run counter to Leduc and Sill
(2004) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010), who found strong inflation fighting regimes more
desirable. We agree with Kormilitsina (2011) that inflation should be accommodated,
but since her conclusion was unclear on the degree of output stimulation to pursue,
our results went further in prescribing the policy that should accompany this inflation-
accommodating stance.
We also shed light on the effect of alternative monetary regimes in the events of other
types of energy price shocks, such as a TFP shock that raises aggregate demand and
demand shocks specific to the energy market. An aggregate shock such as the TFP shock
requires a wholly distinct policy reaction. In this case, the optimal policy favors price
stability. The two energy market-specific demand shocks need policy interventions that
are qualitatively similar to the case of an energy supply shock, but they do highlight
important quantitative differences that cause the impact/effectiveness of various mone-
tary regimes to vary between them. In none of these shocks, however, does a desirable
monetary response entail responding positively to energy price, in terms of minimizing
welfare loss.
The explicit modeling of goods with different degrees of energy dependency allowed
us to gain important insights into the inter-sectoral dynamics. When a shock is more
confined to the energy market, a surge in the price of energy relative to other goods can
be very large, and the energy price shock hits energy-dependent goods and non-energy-
dependent goods quite differently. The durable sector suffers comparatively more on its
demand side than does the non-durable sector, which is affected primarily through its
supply side. Our analysis on sectoral price rigidities indicates that the degree of price
stickiness of more energy-dependent goods plays a greater role in the propagation of
energy price shocks because the behavior of the less energy-dependent goods sector is
more sensitive to this price rigidity than vice versa.
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Tables and Figures
Moments Values
Eh/Y 0.0456
Id/Y 0.0932
D/Y 1.3668
Ef/Y 0.0517
K/Y 12.000
H 0.3000
Table 6: Targeted Ratios
The aggregates present in the ratios are real GDP (Y ), household’s and production
energy usages (Eh and Ef respectively), durables consumption (Id), durables and capital
stock (D and K), and labour (H). They each have a broadly corresponding theoretical
counterpart in the model of Dhawan and Jeske (2008). Since in these variables our model
matches the model of Dhawan and Jeske (2008) quite closely, these ratios provide good
empirical bases with which to calibrate the theoretical moments of these variables in our
model.
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Figure 1: Welfare gain in the case of a negative productivity shock to the energy sector.
Figure 2: Response of inflation at αy = 0.3.
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Figure 3: Inflation and interest rate in response to energy supply shock with welfare-maximizing monetary
regime.
Figure 4: Impact of energy supply shock without monetary intervention.
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Figure 5: Impact of energy supply shock without monetary intervention.
Figure 6: Comparison of output and welfare between sole inflation focus and no monetary intervention
in the case of energy supply shock.
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Figure 7: Comparison of output and consumption between optimal monetary regime and no monetary
intervention in the case of energy supply shock.
Figure 8: Comparison of output and inflation between sole output focus and no monetary intervention
in the case of energy supply shock.
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Figure 9: Impact of a positive TFP shock to non-energy producers without monetary intervention.
Figure 10: Welfare gain in the case of a positive TFP shock to the non-energy sectors.
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Figure 11: Inflation and interest rate in response to a positive TFP shock to non-energy producers with
welfare-maximizing monetary regime.
Figure 12: Comparison of investments and consumption between optimal monetary regime and sole
output focus in the case of a positive TFP shock to the non-energy producers.
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Figure 13: Welfare gain in the case of a positive shock to the energy intensity of durables.
Figure 14: Welfare gain in the case of a positive shock to the energy intensity of capital.
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Figure 15: response of output to energy supply shock at three
degrees of non-durables price rigidity under baseline Taylor
rule
Figure 16: response of output to energy supply shock at three
degrees of durables price rigidity under baseline Taylor rule
Figure 17: response of output to a positive TFP shock to
non-energy producers at three degrees of non-durables price
rigidity under baseline Taylor rule
Figure 18: response of output to a positive TFP shock to non-
energy producers at three degrees of durables price rigidity
under baseline Taylor rule
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Appendices
A Table of Calibrated Parameters
Table 7:
Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
ϕ 0.34 Share of consumption in household’s utility
α 0.2 Share of durables in household’s consumption
ρ 1 - 1/0.99 Durables-nondurables CES parameter
δk 0.015 Capital depreciation rate
a1 0.055 Param1 of durables depreciation function
a2 0.3 Param2 of durables depreciation function
γe1 0.60 Capital share of energy production function
γd1 0.34 Capital share of durables production function
γn1 0.38 Capital share of nondurables production function
ωk1 3 Param1 of capital adj. cost function
ωk2 1 Param2 of capital adj. cost function
ωd1 6 Param1 of durables adj. cost function
ωd2 1 Param2 of durables adj. cost function
ωB1 0.001 Param1 of portfolio adj. cost function
ωB2 1 Param2 of portfolio adj. cost function
B¯ 1.2 Bond target in PAC function
ωe1 3.77 Param1 of energy convex cost function
ωe2 2 Param2 of energy convex cost function
d 5 Elasticity of substitution among varieties of durables
n 5 Elasticity of substitution among varieties of nondurables
φd 46 Price adjustment cost parameter for durables
φn 46 Price adjustment cost parameter for nondurables
a 0.06 Energy intensity of durables
b 0.012 Energy intensity of capital
αr 0.8 Lagged interest rate coefficient of the monetary rule
αpi 0.2 Inflation coefficient parameter of the monetary rule
αy 0.09 Output coefficient parameter of the monetary rule
p¯i 1 Steady-state gross inflation
g 0.18 Steady-steady share of government spending
τc 0.07 Steady-state consumption tax
τi 0.15 Steady-state income tax
τe,c 0.10 Steady-state energy tax on households
τe,f 0.10 Steady-state energy tax on producers
ρc 0.08 Lagged tax rate coefficient of the consumption tax rule
ρi 0.08 Lagged tax rate coefficient of the income tax rule
ρe,c 0.08 Lagged tax rate coefficient of the energy tax rule for consumers
ρe,f 0.08 Lagged tax rate coefficient of the energy tax rule for producers
φc 0.12 Bond coefficient of the consumption tax rule
φi 0.12 Bond coefficient of the income tax rule
φe,c 0.12 Bond coefficient of the energy tax rule for consumers
φe,f 0.12 Bond coefficient of the energy tax rule for producers
ρA1 0.95 Persistence of shock to energy suppy
ρe1 0.95 Persistence of TFP shock to non-energy producers
ρa 0.95 Persistence of shock to energy intensity of durables
ρb 0.95 Persistence of shock to energy intensity of capital
σe,t 0.021 Standard error of shock to energy supply
σA,t 0.0065 Standard error of TFP shock to non-energy producers
σa,t 0.0006 Standard error of shock to energy intensity of durables
σb,t 0.0012 Standard error of shock to energy intensity of capital
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B Equilibrium Conditions
Household’s first order conditions
Euler equation for durables
(1− α)1−ρ pd,t
pn,t
c−ρt n
ρ−1
t
(
1 + ωd1
dt
(
dt+1−dt
dt
)ωd2)
= βEα1−ρc−ρt+1(ut+1dt+1)
ρ−1ut+1
+βE (1−α)
1−ρ
(1+τc,t+1)pn,t+1
c−ρt+1n
ρ−1
t+1 [−ape,t+1(1 + τe,c,t+1)ut+1
+(1 + τc,t+1)pd,t+1
(
1− δd,t+1 + ωd1dt+2d2t+1
(
dt+2−dt+1
dt+1
)ωd2)
]
Euler equation for capital
pd,t
(1+τc,t)pn,t
c−ρt n
ρ−1
t
(
1 + ωk1
kt
(
kt+1−dt
kt
)ωk2)
=
βE
c−ρt+1n
ρ−1
t+1
(1+τc,t+1)pn,t+1
[(1− τi,t+1)rt+1 + pd,t+1
(
1− δk + ωk1kt+2k2t+1
(
kt+2−kt+1
kt+1
)ωk2)
]
Euler equation for bond
c−ρt n
ρ−1
t
(1 + τc,t)pn,t
(
1 + ωB1
(
Bt+1 − B¯
)ωB2) = βE(1 +Rt+1) c−ρt+1nρ−1t+1
(1 + τc,t+1)pn,t+1
Intra-temporal nondurables-labor
(1− α)1−ρ ϕ
1− ϕ(1− ht)c
−ρ
t n
ρ−1
t =
(1 + τc,t)pn,t
(1− τi,t)wt
Intra-temporal nondurables-utilization
(1− α)1−ρ
α1−ρ
nρ−1t
(utdt)ρ−1
=
(1 + τc,t)pn,t
a(1 + τe,c,t)pe,t + (1 + τc,t)pd,tδ
′
d,t
with
ct = [α
1−ρ(utdt)ρ + (1− α)1−ρntρ]1/ρ
Budget constraint
(1 + τe,c,t)pe,tautdt + (1 + τc,t)pn,tnt + (1 + τc,t)pd,tid,t + pd,tik,t + iB,t
= (1− τi,t)(wtht + rtkt) +RtBt
Investment adjustment costs and variable depreciation
id,t = dt+1 − (1− δd,t)dt + ωd1
1 + ωd2
(
dt+1 − dt
dt
)1+ωd2
ik,t = kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + ωk1
1 + ωk2
(
kt+1 − kt
kt
)1+ωk2
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iB,t = Bt+1 −Bt + ωB1
1 + ωB2
(
Bt+1 − B¯
)1+ωB2
δd,t =
a1
a2 + 1
ut
a2+1
Sectors’ aggregate outputs
ye,t = exp(Ae,t)k
γe
e,th
1−γe
e,t
be,t =
ωe1
(1 + ωe2)
(kγee,th
1−γe
e,t )
1+ωe2
yi,t = exp(At) (ki,t)
γi (hi,t)
1−γi − χi
with i = d, n
Firms’ first order conditions
mci,texp(At)(1− γi)
(
ki,t
hi,t
)γi
=
wt
pi,t
1− γi
γi
ki,t
hi,t
=
wt
rt + bpe,t(1 + τe,f,t)
pe,texp(Ae,t)γe
(
ke,t
he,t
)γe−1
= rt + be,tpe,t(1 + τe,f,t) + ke,tpe,t(1 + τe,f,t)b
′
e,th
1−γe
e,t γek
γe−1
e,t
pe,texp(Ae,t)(1− γe)
(
ke,t
he,t
)γe
= wt + ke,tpe,t(1 + τe,f,t)b
′
e,th
−γe
e,t (1− γe)kγee,t
Sectoral Phillips curves
pˆii,t = βEt[pˆii,t+1] +
i − 1
ϑi
mˆcit
with i = d, n
Fiscal and monetary policies
Government budget constraint
τe,c,tpe,tautdt + τe,f,tpe,t(b(kd,t + kn,t) + be,tke,t) + τc,t(pn,tnt + pd,tid,t) + τi,t(rtkt + wtht)
+iB,t = ptgtyt +RtBt
Tax rules
log
(
τ(),t
τ¯()
)
= ρ()log
(
τ(),t−1
τ¯()
)
+ φ()log
(
Bt
B¯
)
(38)
with () = (e, c), (e, f), c, i
Monetary policy function
Rt −R∗ = αR(Rt−1 −R∗) + αpi(pit − pi∗) + αy(yt − yt−1) + r,t
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Market clearing
kt = kd,t + kn,t + ke,t
ht = hd,t + hn,t + he,t
yd,t = id,t + ik,t + gd,t +
ϑd
2
(pid,t − 1)2yd,t
yn,t = nt + gn,t +
ϑn
2
(pin,t − 1)2yn,t
gtyt =
[
α1−ρgρd,t + (1− α)1−ρgρn,t
]1/ρ
ptgtyt = pd,tgd,t + pn,tgn,t + pe,tagd,t
Aggregate price and aggregate value added
pt =
[
α (pd,t + ape,t)
ρ
ρ−1 + (1− α)p
ρ
ρ−1
n,t
] ρ−1
ρ
ptyt = pd,tyd,t + pn,tyn,t + pe,tautdt
Exogenous shock process
At = ρAAt−1 + A,t
Ae,t = ρeAe,t−1 + e,t
gt = ρggt−1 + g,t
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